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This report asks the question, Can the Department of Defense Pro-
gram Change Proposal system be modified in such a way as to improve
programming flexibility and responsiveness to change?' 1 This search is
directed toward improving the management situation at the military service
and department level. The report is critical of the present complex, highly
centralized, compliance oriented process answerable only to the Secretary
of Defense. Recognizing that the "key ' to flexible response on the part of
service and departmental managers lies in decentralizing, to some degree,
the authority that the Secretary of Defense has relegated to his hierarchical
position, and recognizing that centralized authority so ingrained is unlikely
ever to reverse itself, still it seems that there is only one path to follow.
In viewing the Program Change Proposal (PCP) system, we see
(1) thresholds and (2) requirements for detailed costing as being the most
approachable manifestations of centralized authority. Therefore, it is in
these two regards that we shall expect to offer our contributions toward an
improved process. The author feels quite strongly that the benefits to the
system from any relinquishing of centralized authority to military service
and departmental level managers will far outweigh the resulting costs.
While it is realized that a major review of the Department of
Defense (DOD) management planning process is being conducted concurrently
ii

with this report, and that the 'scent of change is in the air, the present PCP
system, rather than conjecture as to future systems, necessarily commands
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The Problem of Rigidity
This paper examines the Department of Defense Planning
-
Programming -Budgeting System and the degree to which certain management
techniques are exercised in striving for achievement of the planned objectives
of that system. It is felt that there is an inherent rigidity built into the pres-
ent process and that this rigidity, which perhaps was needed in earlier years
to insure compliance and control, has outlived its management purpose. It is
the thesis of this writer that the requirements and management techniques
which contribute to system rigidity are all reflected to some extent in the pub-
lished Program Change Proposal procedures, and that it is here that we
should first look in seeking a means of relaxing restrictive elements. To the
extent that inflexibility can be alleviated, the system can be expected to
improve in its responsiveness to changing external factors and influences, as
well as to better serve those who would exploit it as an effective management
tool.
An Overview
In early 1961, a new planning and programming system was initiated
within the Department of Defense in a move by Secretary of Defense Robert S.
1

McNamara to introduce and implement scientific techniques of management
in defense decision making. The ultimate aim was to manage the entire
defense establishment by the end objectives of missions performed. In addi-
tion, programming would provide a link by which these missions could be
translated, in terms of cost, into meaningful budgets expressed in traditional
budget terms and categorized in accordance with the appropriation structure.
Prior to this time, no Secretary of Defense had managed to integrate stra-
tegic plans and overall defense programs with the annual budget. This was
one of the underlying aims of both the 1947 National Security Act and the
1949 Amendment to the National Security Act (which further asserted the role
of the Secretary of Defense in the accomplishment of this endeavor).
Traditionally, the budgets of the three military departments had been
consolidated annually at DOD level and simply combined to form the proposed
defense budget. Here, in conjunction with Bureau of the Budget Examiners,
Defense Department representatives trimmed the budget to coincide with
administrative estimates of the level of defense spending that the economy
could bear. This amount represented the figure that the President would
request from the Congress in support of the defense establishment. It could
be expected that the President's budget request would be cut further in the
House of Representatives and that, hopefully, any such cut would be restored
in the Senate. In any event, the final budget figure approved would be par-
celled back to the services in appropriation terms of activities or functions
(such as procurement), rather than in terms of the end objectives that the

funds were meant to achieve. Since integrated defense objectives were not
spelled out, the military departments were free to allocate their appropriated
funds as they saw fit toward the fulfillment of their own particular plans and
objectives, and toward supporting their own area and special interests. No
device was available to the Secretary of Defense by which the various parallel
or alternative means toward the achievement of objectives, as developed by
the separate services, could be compared on the basis of cost, efficiency,
or trade-off potential.
Now, under the new planning and programming process, machinery
had been installed to permit the Secretary of Defense to maintain a continually
updated record of all approved programs for the entire defense establishment
(see Chapter IV for details of the Planning -Programming -Budgeting and
Program Change Proposal processes). The system was structured so that
McNamara personally had to approve all over threshold changes and any addi-
tions or deletions to the "Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program,
as the compilation of all approved programs is titled. While budget proposals
would be submitted as before to the Bureau of the Budget and to the Congress
for approval and appropriation, respectively, it was now the Secretary of
Defense who determined what and "whose programs were going to be
included in the DOD budget request. Likewise, it was he who would deter-
mine, in the light of the amount of the approved budget, "what ' and whose'
programs were to be cut back, discontinued, or favored.

As an aid to decision making, McNamara insisted on the employment
of scientific management techniques in the form of cost-effectiveness
studies, which are military-economic studies that compare alternative ways
of accomplishing national security objectives and that try to determine the
way that contributes the most for a given cost, or achieves a given objective
at the least cost. (These studies are discussed in detail in Chapter III.
)
Thus, we see that the Secretary, his value judgments reinforced
through scientific analyses of alternative courses of action, had grasped con-
trol of the structure and strategy of the four services through the program-
ming tool, thereby enabling him to command them and direct them toward the
accomplishment of their particular shares of the overall defense mission.
Retrospect
We are now able, in retrospect, to view the performance of the new
Department of Defense management process and the Five-Year Force Struc-
ture and Financial Program over the several years since its inception. The
basic principles of the new system, such as centralized decision making on
matters which cross service boundaries, and the use of scientific tools of
management, such as cost-effectiveness studies, have become generally
accepted. Indeed, many argue that we could never have achieved the broad
defense capability we enjoy today without the benefit of the new system and
procedures.

Many other voices have been raised, however, in discordance with
the system and with the management techniques being exercised by McNamara
and his staff assistants. Most criticism seems to spring from problems pre-
cipitated by the degree of centralization of management, authority, and con-
trol exercised over the services by the continually expanding and more
burdensome Office of the Secretary of Defense. Another separate but def-
initely related problem centers on McNamara' s insistence on scientific
approaches to decision making, coupled with a show me ' attitude, which
establishes an aura of negativism over the entire process in addition to
excepting from consideration those programs which have value in light of
professional military judgment but which cannot be fully documented or costed
initially. (Chapters II and III will examine these particular areas of dissen-
sion more fully in order to assess the validity of criticisms. This step is
necessary in order to establish the criteria for assessing the effectiveness





The exercise of authority and control within any organization can be
thought of as existing on a continuum somewhere between complete centrali-
zation and complete decentralization of management. The Department of
Defense position, prior to the institution of the program budgeting process
by McNamara in 1961, can be considered as having existed toward the latter
end of the scale.
This situation can be viewed as a carry-over of the traditional autono-
mous management of the services prior to establishment of the Department
of Defense as a new, coordinating hierarchy under the National Security Act
of 1947 and subsequent legislation. Each of the services defined national
security objectives, formulated independent plans toward the accomplishment
of these objectives, and provided for research, development, testing, and
contracting for the procurement of weapon systems with which to fulfill its
individual mission on land, sea, or air. The process lacked an overall
directing force and the services often funneled funds into parallel or dupli-
cating projects with little or no combining of efforts or exchanging of infor-
mation and technology to the benefit of the public purse. This then was the
situation facing McNamara upon his appointment as Secretary of Defense by





aforementioned completely decentralized and just as completely ingrown tra-
ditional management process; on the other side he was faced by legislation
that removed all doubts as to the authority of the Secretary of Defense in
assuming centralized management and control of the defense establishment.
As the RAND Corporation's David Novick observes, Mr. McNamara's
forceful personality combined with the recognition of a legal basis for action
was to result in a major movement toward integrated defense planning. '
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Charles J. Hitch recalls
from this critical period:
The new Secretary of Defense . . . made it clear from the beginning
that he intended to be the kind of Secretary that f would/ . . . take the
initiative in planning and direction of the defense program. Further-
more, Secretary McNamara made it known that he wanted to manage
the defense effort in terms of meaningful program entities, of 'outputs'
like the B-52 force, the POLARIS force, the Army Air -borne Division
force, etc. , associating with each output all the inputs of equipment,
personnel, supplies, facilities, and funds, regardless of the appropria-
tion account in which each was financed. He wanted to know and, indeed,
would have to know in order to optimize the allocation of resources, the
cost of, for example, a B-52 wing --not only the cost of equipping the
wing but also the cost of manning and operating it for its lifetime or at
least for a reasonable period of years in the future. Only then would he
be in a position to assess the cost and effectiveness of a B-52 wing as
compared with other systems designed to perform the same or similar
tasks. ^
At this point we are able to observe the beginning bases in thought for
what has since been viewed as a revolution in defense management. Hitch
continues:
David Novick, Program Budgeting (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1964), p. 51.
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Charles J. Hitch, Decision Making for Defense (Berkeley and JLos
Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 27.

These views closely coincided with my own . . . that the financial
management system of the Defense Department must serve many pur-
poses. It must produce a budget in a form acceptable to Congress. It
must account for the funds in the same manner in which they were
appropriated. It must provide managers at all levels in the defense
establishment the financial information they need to do their particular
jobs in an effective and economical manner. It must produce the finan-
cial information required by other agencies of the government, the
Bureau of the Budget, the Treasury, and the General Accounting Office.
But we both were convinced that the financial management system
must also provide the data needed by top defense management to make
the really crucial decisions, particularly on the major forces and
weapon systems needed to carry out the principal missions of the de-
fense establishment. And we were well aware that the financial man-
agement system, as it had evolved over the years, could not directly
produce the required data in the form desired. It was clear that a new
function, which we call programming, would have to be incorporated in
the financial management system. I had hoped that I would have at
least a year to smooth the way for the introduction of this new function.
I recall outlining the proposed programming system to Secretary
McNamara in the spring of 1961 and recommending that we spend
eighteen months developing and installing it, beginning in the first year
with a limited number of trial programs, with a view to expanding the
system to include all programs during 1962. The Secretary approved
the proposed system but shortened my timetable from eighteen months
to six. Somehow we developed and installed it, Department-wide, in
time to use it as a basis for the fiscal 1963 defense budget. ^
Critics should take particular note at this time of the complexity of
the task undertaken by the Secretary of Defense. Not only the pertinent bases
laid in law, but the immensity of the project itself demanded more centralized
decision making at Defense Department level. A move toward centralization
of management must therefore be accepted as the logical approach for the
Secretary to follow and criticisms must be centered then, on the degree ' of
centralization of authority and control that had to be exalted to the Secretary's





Novick describes the new planning and programming process, as
follows, shortly after its installation:
The new process incorporates an up-to-date, five-year force struc-
ture and financial program, expressed in terms of forces, manpower,
and dollar requirements. Since this nrogram requires a continuous type
of budget review, a program change control system was developed to aid
in achieving this requirement. In this system, approval thresholds are
established to concentrate attention on the major current or prospective
issues, this being an obvious application of "management by exception. "
These thresholds are in terms of total obligational authority require-
ments, for the current or budget fiscal year and on a total basis. A
progress reporting procedure for about 200 of the most important mate-
rial items is employed. Milestone schedules are established to reflect
the events and activities upon which the financial plan is based. Actual
accomplishment is reviewed monthly against the milestones and reme-
dial action is taken or revisions are made to the five-year plan as
necessary.
*
While requirements for dollar costing of future force and manpower
levels, along with continuous budget review, as described by Novick, were
sure to prove a burden to the services, it is felt, from the standpoint of cen-
tralization of authority and control, that the establishment of thresholds and
reporting procedures offers us the best criteria for assessing the degree to
which such centralization of the management function is carried out.
Thresholds establish ceilings on the exercise of decision making, authority,
and control by managers at lower levels in the hierarchy. Reporting proce-
dures point up performance variances, deviations from established schedules
or budgets, and non-compliance with established procedures and directives.
Both thresholds and reporting requirements can be recognized as being
4
David Novick, Prog ram Budgeting: Long -Range Planning in the
Department of Defense (Santa Monica, Calif. : The RAND Corporation,
November, 1962), p. v.
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restrictive elements within the system, in that they confine the performance
of lower managers to within certain specified limits. The degree of flexibil-
ity within the system can be assumed to vary in a direct relationship to the
level at which subordinate authority thresholds are established, and to vary
inversely with the stringency of performance standards and reporting require-
ments. System difficulties in both of these areas will tend to be manifested
in the form of human problems.
This contention is reinforced by Roland N. McKean and Melvin Anshen,
who, in assessing problems, risks, and limitations of program budgeting as
they might be reflected in a theoretical agency, OSR (which looks far more
like an after-the-fact review of the Department of Defense process), warn of
too centralized authority and of certain long-run costs that must be weighed
5
against the benefits of such centralization. In summarizing their views, it
is noted that low thresholds result in more and m:re decision making moving
to the top. Lower -level managers thus find that they have no bargaining
power, that their views have no impact at higher levels, and that they lack
authority to initiate studies or pilot projects that might substantiate their
views. In such cases, incentives to invent and urge alternatives are weak-
ened; it becomes less rewarding to innovate; and with greater pressures for
compliance alone, lower-level groups become biased toward safe ' propo-
sals and refrain from rocking the boat.
5
Roland N. McKean and Melvin Anshen, Program Budgeting , ed.




On the other hand, these same low thresholds result in more decision
making at the top level. McKean and Anshen point out that as loss of incen-
tives and motivation or efforts to fight the system affect the contributions of
lower level managers even more adversely, the central group finds more and
more of the burden falling at its doorstep. Studies tend to become increas-
ingly centralized, resulting in harsh screening from a particular point of
view. Analyses tend to become 'design studies'' of one "required system" as
analysts and reviewers perceive that their superiors frown on certain alterna-
tives which therefore are not considered.
As the central group makes more and more of the decisions and
records them in an official plan, McKean and Anshen contend that they under-
standably tend to defend these decisions and resist changes. A natural desire
to keep lower level agencies from constantly reopening issues may convert
what ought to b sequences of decisions into one-shot decisions which, over
the long run, might aggregate the tendency to pick 'best" prematurely and
to become unnecessarily committed to a course of action.
Another consequence of excessive central control of programs is the
neglect of uncertainty resulting from consideration of the judgments of one
group as opposed to the diverse judgments of several branches or agencies.
Uncertainties tend to be further neglected as the magnitude of the task of cen-
tral control makes it essential to simplify decision making, since the natural
way to simplify a decision is to disregard uncertainties. Lower level groups
tend to become biased toward "safe" proposals because the cost of hedging
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against uncertainty is hard to justify to a cost-conscious central group.
Lester Bittel, in his recent book, Management by Exception , sheds
further light on our subject. In case studies involving the introduction into
functioning organizations of well laid, systematic, logical plans (an apt
description of the program budgeting process), he traces subsequent failures
to the inability of management to deal with human variables. Results dis-
closed that top management's expressed requirements for full reports, rigid
controls, exhaustive financial analysis, and, in one case, for itemizing of
expense accounts brought reactions on the part of lower level managers,
exemplified by feelings of threat to security or to the exercise of preroga-
tives, feelings of conflict due to sudden change and, in the last case, feelings
of an implied insult to individual integrity. Bittel goes on to tie such factors
in with management at the Pentagon:
In a 1963 editorial Life magazine was critical of what it called
"McNamara 1 s Human Problem. " Although the editorial acknowledged
that "In most respects, McNamara is the best Secretary of Defense the
U. S. has had, " it deplored his coldly analytical efficiency, which in
Life's view destroys the support of military leaders 'to whom strategy
and tactics are arts, not sciences, anc who need operating flexibility
as well as the clear management line imposed by the Secretary. ' ; Life
concluded, "We need not choose between efficiency and leadership; the
nation needs both. It also wants the civilian Secretary to have the last
word. But he has evidently been having it in too abrupt, rigid, and even
contemptuous fashion. In short, he has a management problem of the
most important kind, human management. When he surmounts that one,
he will be a great Defense Secretary. "
Mr. McNamara, as are indeed most executives, was not aware of
the human problem. His difficulty was in solving it. He, like the rest,





logical action on the one hand and intelligent permissiveness on the other.
For without the latter, experience tells most managers, they will not
gain the support and cooperation needed to move an organization forward
in unity.
While there remains too much contrary evidence for us to accent
Bittel' s implication that McNarnara has solved his human problem, " he does
point the way for our later approach to the question of centralization of
authority and control as opposed to system flexibility and responsiveness to
changing conditions. We can see that many criticisms of the system arise
out of conflict between the motivations of individual lower level managers and
the degree to which the basic structuring of the system inhibits or thwarts
them as they seek the fulfillment of their individual needs, such as security,
status, achievement, participation, and self -fulfillment. One of the lessons
we should learn here is that many criticisms are likely to be but superficial
indications of more deeply rooted structural deficiencies which are not neces-
sarily apparent, nor will they be easily identified in degree. In such a case,
it would seem appropriate to assume, to the extent that we can isolate and
identify the problem, that a little less, or a little more, of the critical factor,
as the case may be, will benefit the system (we hope, through closer align-
ment of individual and organizational goals). In other words, we are unlikely
to find a case in which the problem is so obvious, and the decision so clear-
cut, that we are able to arrive at an optimal solution; but we are more likely
7
Lester R. Bittel, Management by Exception (New York and San Fran-
cisco: McGraw-Hill, Inc. , 1964), pp. 262-264.
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to face a situation where recommendation of a more favorable "range" of





We are drawn to an examination of the Secretary's scientific manage-
ment methods by the vast amount of criticism that their use has engendered.
These decision-making procedures are generally summarized in the term
"systems analysis, ' which includes the controversial and closely related
"cost-effectiveness,'' "cost -benefit, and cost-utility' analyses.
A basic premise of the entire concept of systems analysis as a tool
for defense decision making is that military decisions are economic decisions.
This recognizes that our wants are limited by the scarcity of resources (dol-
lars, manpower, materials), otherwise we could have ail of everything we
wanted and there would be no need to exercise choice. Since we are limited
by resource constraints, and since we are faced with problems of choice, we
must be guided in our decision making by consideration of the opportunity
costs of that which we must forego, in order to have something else. If we
are the Secretary of Defense, this means that every dollar spent toward the
accomplishment of a particular mission, or achievement of a particular capa-
bility, is one dollar less to be spent toward the accomplishment of other just-





The systems analysis " tool permits the consideration of possible
alternatives and potential trade-offs among them over a wide range, and
eliminates from consideration those alternatives that do not fit the established
criteria. In this manner, the decision maker is able to concentrate his ener-
gies on the few really relevant alternatives in arriving at a more thorough-
going decision.
While such a system would seem to lead to much more efficient
decision making, the cries of critics would suggest that perhaps there are
weak points to the process, along with the benefits to be derived. One such
critic, Hanson Baldwin, who has referred to McNamara as the apostle of
cost-effectiveness, " seems to have summarized a goodly number of the most
often heard criticisms when he charges:
Mr. McNamara's "whiz-kids' 1 complete with sliderules and compu-
ters brushed aside the factor of professional judgment or scientific
hunch when they took office and their emphasis on "perfection on paper"
and the cost part of the "cost-effectiveness" formula has definitely
slowed the oace of military development.
Daniel Seligman's findings tend to support Baldwin's criticisms. He
reports:
Systems analysis is an endless source of exasperation to many mili-
tary men and Congressmen, because it often leads the Pentagon to resist
intuitive judgments whose truth seems perfectly obvious. ^
Seligman notes also the widely held view that 'cost-effectiveness studies are,
Hanson W. Baldwin, Slow-Down at the Pentagon, " Foreign Affairs
,
Vol. 43, Nos. 1-4 (October 1964 to July 1965), p. 263.
2
Daniel Seligman, McNamara's Management Revolution, " Fortune
,
Vol. LXXH, No. 1 (July, 1965), p. 246.

17
in effect, elaborate rationalizations for not buying things we need, or for
buying second-rate weapons systems, for endangering our men's lives in an
effort to save money. "
Hitch too reports that:
The suspicion still persists in some influential quarters that , . .
cost-effectiveness studies put 'dollars before national security " or
will result in going to war with cut-rate, cut -quality, cheapest-to-
buy weapons. M^
As we examine the above arguments, we begin to detect again the pat-
tern observed in our discussion of centralization of management, which
seemed to indicate that many criticisms tend to be superficial reflections of
some deeper antagonism. We can perceive that elevating decision making to
a hierarchical level above the services tends to "brush aside the factor of
orofessional judgment. " Also, we can perceive that in placing cost -effective-
ness studies at this same hierarchical level under the guidance of young,
mathematically grounded analysts ('whiz -kids 1 ') aided by computers, whose
purpose is to cost out alternative courses of action, the experienced military
judgment of lower level managers will have even less influence on the out-
come. The demand for perfection on paper (a reference to the project
definition phase of development) would seem to set aside the scientific hunch"
(ideas or proposals having no present military requirement, but which would




Hitch, Decision Making for Defense, p. 43.
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enemy weapons developed to counter our present weapon systems and capa-
bilities), in that specific operating requirements and the cost effectiveness
of the system must be confirmed and goals, milestones, and time schedules
established before full development is initiated. The argument that cost-
effectiveness studies nut dollars before security is apt to come about when
the initiator of a proposal sees performance trimmed from his weapons sys-
tem in order to cut costs.
While we can agree that there may be some validity, then, to these
arguments, two points seem to manifest themselves through our observations.
First, there seems to be a lack of understanding of the fact that systems
analysis is a "total system" concept and that, as such, it does not lend its
results to interpretation by lower level managers in the same light as they
would view the problem, at their level. This leads into the second point,
which is that critics, perhaps perplexed at facing the vagaries of a process
dealing with advanced mathematics, computers., and uncertainties, seem to
vent their wrath not on the underlying causal factors inherent in the systems
analysis process, but rather on the effects of the methodology as they are
perceived to be reflected in the value judgments of the decision maker.
In response to the first of these points, it should be noted that the
Secretary in his decision-making role is concerned with the same "total
system" as is the systems analyst. Lower level managers, on the other hand,
are "sub-system" managers in the total system concept and, as such, are
rightly concerned with the particular aspects of management and decision
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making applicable to these levels. Because the criteria by which alternatives
are selected differ between system and sub -system levels within the total
system, the lower level manager is apt to fall victim to viewing the top-level
decision in the light of sub-system criteria. Perhaps herein lies the source
of many of the rationalized grievances put forth in criticism of systems analy-
sis as a tool of the decision maker. Perhaps this helps to explain why lower
level managers find their toes stepped on occasionally and their judgments
unheeded (or unwanted), as a logical outgrowth of propounding military judg-
ments based on other than the criteria established for the top-level decision.
The initiator of an airborne weapons system, proposal, for example, is right-
fully concerned when he finds performance cut for the sake of cost. The
Secretary, on the other hand, is concerned with the big picture'; he may
see the opportunity cost of an additional 10 mph of airborne weapons system
capability as being a trade-off against having another fully equipped battle
group or another guided-missile frigate within the total defense arsenal.
The second point we mentioned was that critics seem prone to overlook
the causal factors inherent in systems analysis and tend to direct their criti-
cisms instead at the effects or end results of the studies, as they come to
bear at the point of decision. In order that we too do not find ourselves in
this position, we shall review the systems analysis methodology in order to
detect areas in which the process is subject to error. Through this procedure
we should be better equipped to critically examine the role of systems analysis
as a function of the Department of Defense decision-making process.
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E. S. Quade perhaps offers our best starting point by breaking systems
analysis down into five essential elements:
1. The objective (or objectives). Systems analysis is undertaken
primarily to suggest or, at the very least, to help choose a course of
action. This action must have an aim or objective. Policies or strat-
egies, forces or equipment are examined, compared, and preferred on
the basis of how well and how cheaply they can accomplish the aim or
objective.
2. The alternatives. The alternatives are the means by which it
is hoped the objectives can be attained. They need not be obvious sub-
stitutes or perform the same specific function.
3. The costs. Each alternative means of accomplishing the ob-
jectives implies the use of specific resources which cannot then be
used for other purposes.
4. A model (or models). The model is a representation of the
situation under study designed to predict the cost and performance of
each alternative. It abstracts the relevant features of the situation by
means which may vary from a set of mathematical equations or a com-
puter program to an idealized description of the situation in which judg-
ment alone is used to assess the consequences of various choices.
5. A criterion. A criterion is a rule or test by which one alterna-
tive can be chosen in preference to another. It provides a means for
using cost and effectiveness to order the alternatives. ^
The Objective
The first and key step of a systems analysis is definition of the prob-
lem; stating the problem Limits to be explored; spelling out the meaningful
facts that bear on the problem; recognizing the constraints that limit the
objective;»nd describing the bounds within which it must be achieved. To
the extent that the problem contains non -quantifiable factors, such as prob-
lems of long range, problems whose solution depends on hardware not yet
5
E. S. Quade, Analysis for Military Decisions (Santa Monica, Calif. :
The RAND Corporation, 1964), p. 155.
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developed, or that hypothesize the integration of systems not yet in existence,
the analyst must postulate relative values rather than absolute values in order
to solve the problem. In such a case, the solution will be sought within a
range of value described by the maxima and minima that have been examined.
Of greatest importance here is that the problem is structured so that the right
questions are being asked. The experience, skill, imagination, and intuition
of the analyst plays a key role in starting the analysis off in the right direction.
Alternatives
Alternative, by definition, implies an opportunity to choose from among
more than one possible ootion. Each alternative posed must be an acceptable
potential solution to the stated problem, and it is assumed that all alterna-
tives are comparable, or, if not, that their differences are recognized.
Alternatives are generally differentiated from one another either by function
or by degree of performance. The selection of alternatives for evaluation
must take into consideration the resource constraints to the problem, such
as funds, personnel, equipment, and facilities restrictions. Should the ana-
lyst find that none of the alternatives examined provides a satisfactory solu-
tion to the problem, he should invent new alternatives. On the other hand, if
the possible alternatives prove too numerous to examine individually, many




An assumption is a means used by the analyst to deal with difficult
realities or qualitative factors that tend to upset the problem -solving routine.
The assumption infers the existence of a fact, not known with certainty, from
the known existence of other facts. Because they are not demonstrable,
assumptions tend to become weak points in the analysis; but to the extent that
they do not change the level of uncertainty, or alter the cost-effectiveness
relationship of an alternative, they are useful, essential parts of a problem.
The important thing to bear in mind here is that the conclusions of the analyst
will always be directly relative to the validity of the assumptions on which he
bases his analysis.
The assumptions made in systems analysis have been a source of com-
plaint by experienced military observers who, on occasion, have been able to
disprove an assumption, and therefore disprove an unfavorable conclusion of
the analysis. Quade notes that 'the comparative frequency of such complaints,
which are, sad to say, sometimes quite well founded, is a tribute to the rela-
tive exDlicitness of the assumptions and reasoning in a systems study. " Our
view of such complaints might properly take an opposite approach from that
of Quade. We would note that to the extent that the analyst fails to document
explicitly his assumptions and supporting reasoning, he denies practiced mili-
tary observers the opportunity and the right to criticize the analysis. In such





conclusions of the analysis, is faced with a virtually impossible task of
reconstructing the analysis in an attempt to detect the application of invalid
assumptions, or he must forego the exercise of the right of reclama (or both).
The real impact is likely to be felt in the national defense posture, to the
extent that worthy alternative weaoons systems or capabilities have been fore-
closed from consideration by failure of the analyst to document his
assumptions.
Costs
Perhaps the importance of treating costs as a major element of the
systems analysis methodology is best emphasized by Hitch in the statement:
Furthermore, there has been a tendency in the Defense Department
to state military requirements in absolute terms without reference to
their costs. But the military effectiveness or military worth of any
given weapon system cannot logically be considered in isolation. It
must be considered in relation to its cost, and in a world in which re-
sources are limited, to the alternative uses to which resources can be
put. Military requirements are meaningful only in terms of benefits to
be gained in relation to their cost. Thus, resource costs and military
worth have to be scrutinized together. ?
While we might be inclined to think of costs in terms of budget dollars
alone, we fine that systems analysis views them in a much broader perspec-
tive, as they interact within the system to add to or detract from the attrac-
tiveness of alternative courses of action. Stanford I*. Optner, in describing
7
Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Testimony in Systems Development and Management (part 2), Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations , House of Repre-
sentatives, 87th Cong. , 2d Sess. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1962), p. 515.
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the nature of systems, points out that:
Costs are dimensionally described by dollars, man-hours, pounds,
or other quantitative yardsticks of kind. Costs may also be described
as a period of time . . . (or) may be expressed by assigning values to
qualitative expressions of effectiveness.®
Costs then, as viewed in this much broader context, may enter a systems
analysis in many ways. They may be related to availability of resources, to
the urgency of the achievement of an objective in terms of time, or to the
degree of effectiveness to be achieved.
Complexity enters the systems analysis even further, with the intro-
duction of these three measures of cost, time, and effectiveness. Since the
analyst is able to maximize or minimize only one of these measures at a
time, he is limited at best to optimizing the remaining measures. For exam-
ple, the analyst, faced with minimizing cost, would be able only to optimize
time and effectiveness in the face of the cost constraint. On the other hand,
to maximize effectiveness, he would be unable to minimize costs and time,
because they are the price he must pay in order to maximize effectiveness.
Likewise, we can see that minimizing time is likely to drive costs up and
effectiveness down, so that the analyst can only hope to "optimize, " or gain
the "best " result in relation to the given time allowed.
Another factor which enters and complicates the systems analysis is
the matter of accuracy of cost estimation and the part it plays in reaching a
solution to the problem. We can see that the analyst must carefully weigh
g
Stant jrd L., Optner, Systems Analysis for Business and Industrial
Problem Solving, ed. W. Grant Ireson (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-
Hail, Inc. , 1965), p. 33.
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coat, time, and effectiveness trade-offs in selecting or eliminating alterna-
tives from consideration as potential solutions to the analysis. But if cost
estimates of a certain alternative were underestimated by 1000 per cent,
would not that tend to bias the analysis in favor of this alternative, perhaps
to the exclusion of others ? We believe that it would, and we point to this
factor as a weakness of the analysis, of which the decision maker must be
aware. That such error in cost estimation is a not -too-uncommon occurrence
is pointed out by W. H. Meckling, who relates:
. . . sometimes we (conveniently) forget how far our predictions
have missed the mark in the past. For example, we have found that
estimates of cost of production are seldom within a factor of 2 (200%)
of actual costs, and not uncommonly are off by factors of from 5 to
10. Similarly, slippages in time to operational status of from 2 to 5
years are not unusual. Performance parameters are generally more
accurate, but even here differences of 25 per cent from original esti-
mates are not uncommon. 9
While admittedly courses of action must be assessed, and decisions
made, on the basis of the best cost estimates available, it would seem that
herein lies an easily disregarded weakness of the systems analysis. The
multiplicative effect of mathematical methods used to differentiate between
alternatives is likely to further amplify costing inaccuracies as they come to
bear on the decision. Perhaps a solution here would be to compare alterna-
tives over a range of costs (based on the error rate anc our best cost esti-
mates), and to base our decision on some other factor than cost, in those
q
W. H. Meckling, Analysis for Military Decisions , ed. E. S. Quade
(Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1964), p. 228.
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cases where both the acceptance and elimination of the alternative as a poten-
tial solution fall within this particular range.
Model 8
The role of the model in systems analysis is that it is a manipulatable
representation of the real-life system under investigation. The model is
built on a set of assumptions which allow us to simplify it in such a way as to
highlight those factors which are relevant to the problem and to suppress
those that are relatively unimportant. Usually the model is in the form of an
equation or set of equations which express an identified relationship that
exists among a set of relevant variables. By holding constant one variable
at a time and maninulating another, it is possible to view the interaction of
the separate variables over a wide range of system activity. Thus, through
use of the model, alternatives may be examined over a range of activity not
readily observable in real life, then arrayed for the decision maker over a
range that would cover all likely contingency situations.
The model can be an extremely useful tool, properly constructed and
directed toward answering the questions that the analysis is attempting to
answer. There are, however, several factors of model construction that bear
watching: qualitative factors, assumptions, and the aggregating or lumping of
diverse items. Since the model is able to represent only quantifiable factors,
qualitative factors may properly be set aside; but they must be set aside
explicitly for later consideration of their effects along with the output of the
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model. We have already discussed assumptions as a tool for simplifying hard-
to -handle factors of reality that tend to complicate the analysis. We should
remember that assumptions also must be explicitly set forth in the analysis
in order that any factors eliminated from consideration, which should later
prove relevant to the study, are apparent to the decision maker. The third
factor, aggregating, refers to the lumping together, for example, of such
diverse factors as pay and allowances, travel costs, and training costs under
personnel costs, in order to simplify the model. It would seem that such
aggregating, too, must be explicitly set forth in the analysis, in that while
aggregated values may vary relatively little over a broad range of alternative
comparisons, they are likely to have highly divergent and easily overlooked
effects if the model is operated at extremes of its useful range. Properly
documented, such factors are open to observation and criticism, and thus
support the validity of the model.
A Criterion
A criterion was earlier described as a rule or test by which one alter-
native can be chosen in preference to another and as providing a means for
using cost and effectiveness to order the alternatives. In addition, it is a
device through which the analyst is able to show consistency in his exercise
of preferredness in choosing among alternatives.
It is important for us to understand that both the objective and the con-
straint are employed in designing the criterion which is first conceived in
terms of the objective, and then conditioned by the constraints. For example,
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our objective might be to achieve a certain amount of damage against an
enemy installation. Having determined this objective, we would then seek to
establish the least cost means of achieving this ability, cost being the condi-
tioning constraint.
The choice of criterion may be complicated by the fact that quantita-
tive measures may at tim.es have to give way to qualitative measures of pre-
ferredness. While the fine measurability of quantifiable criterion is lost, the
analyst is still able to order alternatives in the qualitative sense of best to
worst, or high to low.
Generally, the analyst will attempt to treat large complex problems
with broad criteria; however, at times he is forced to break the large prob-
lem down into component sub -problems. In such a case, he must devise
appropriate, narrow criteria with which to treat these sub-problems, mindful
of the fact that what seem to be plausible tests of lower level choices may
easily be inconsistent with higher level choices.
In summary, we must insure that the analyst is consistent in his exer-
cise of preferredness, that the stated criterion is structured in terms of the
objective, as conditioned by the constraints of the problem, that the criterion
provides a means of measuring the relative worth or effectiveness of alterna-
tives, and that sub-rsroblem criteria are consistent with higher level criteria.
To the extent that criteria fall short of meeting these tests, McKean suggests
that we can subject alternatives to more than one test and "look for domi-




"interpreting the analysis, drawing conclusions, and drafting recommendations";
or finally, that we can give up the use of any neat criterion and simply spell
out, for sensible alternatives, certain relevant consequences called costs and
others called the achievement of objectives, " and array them before the
decision maker for his judgment.
R. N. McKean, Analysis for Military Decisions , ed. E. S. Quade




In Chanter I, we alluded to an inherent rigidity having been built into
the Department of Defense management process. It is the thesis of this
writer that an approach to relaxing such system rigidity lies in slackening
the stringencies of management techniques and requirements as effected
through Program Change Proposal procedures. With this view, we shall
examine in this Chapter the present planning, programming, budgeting, and
program change processes as set forth in applicable Department of Defense
and service directives, with the aim of highlighting those management tech-
niques and requirements that would seem to bear on our problem.
Planning
Planning plays a decisive role in focusing attention on future goals,
objectives, and capabilities. In addition, planning imparts direction to the
expenditure of effort and resources toward the achievement of these objectives
and capabilities. Long-range plans of the services, as characterized by those
Discussion which follows is drawn from DOD Directive 7045. 1,
'DOD Programming System, October 30, 1964; DOD Instruction 7045. 2,
DOD Programming System; Procedures for Program Changes, January 29.
1965; DOD Instruction 7045. 5, DOD Programming System; Functional Pro-
gram Reviews, " August 31, 1965; and HQO p 3121. 2, Marine Corps Manual




of the Navy and Marine Coroa, typically look ten to twenty years into the
future. Here they are concerned with appraisal of the strategic situation,
concepts of operation, capabilities, force structures, and other requirements
which reflect analysis of the threat perceived to be possible in the time period
considered, in light of basic national security policy. These long-range plans
are time phased into the period ranging from two to ten years in the future in
the form of mid -range objectives plans which take into consideration and
reflect guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decisions of the Secretary of
Defense on forces, resources, and capabilities, results of special studies,
and recommendations of force commanders in the field.
In addition to these unilaterally developed plans, the services partici-
pate in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other joint planning (as in the case of
service participation in one of the unified and specified commands, or in the
case of joint operation such as experienced by the Marine Corps and the Navy,
under the Secretary of the Navy). Through the participating service member
of the JCS, the service's views, comments, and recommendations, plus any
information or guidance on forces, are submitted for inclusion in JCS plans
during preparation, review, and revision, or for JCS consideration in the
case of service participation reflected in JCS reviewed plans of commanders
of the unified and specified commands. Thus, in addition to receiving JCS
guidance in the formulation of unilaterally developed plans, the services in
turn feed back their own recommendations and comments for consideration




Upon completion of the annual Joint Chiefs of Staff review of the Joint
Strategic Objectives Plan, it is sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
where it is reviewed, anc! becomes the basis for the issuance of Tentative
Force Guidance (TFG). Such tentative guidance is issued by the Secretary
of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments, the Department of
Defense agencies, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the extent that the decisions
affect then). TFG is tentative only in the sense that it is subject to reclama
(appeal) by an addressee, and it applies primarily to major force levels to be
included in the next budget. Upon receipt of comments or reclamas, the
Secretary of Defense either confirms or modifies his original decision, this
final decision becoming the basis for preparation and submission of Program
Change Proposals (PCP's), approval of which constitutes approval of the
resources required to support the particular force change.
Programming
Programming is the management tool by which plans are translated
into capabilities. It involves determination of quantity and timing of resource
requirements and emphasizes the realities of cost, feasibility, and effective-
ness. Programming examines and identifies alternative courses of action to
achieve approved objectives. It provides an integrating link between the func-
tions of military planning and budgeting.
To the extent that military plans are approved by the Secretary of
Defense, they become time phased into the Five -Year Force Structure and
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Financial Program (FYFS&FP), which contains all approved programs within
the Department of Defense in terms of missions or national objectives. The
FYFS&FP projects not only military plans, but the associated resource im-
pact of the approved forces for eight fiscal years into the future, and projects
the remainder of the program (i. e. , manpower, equipment, suoolies, and
installations required to support them) for five fiscal years into the future.
In addition, the program projects the full costs of these resources, thus allow-
ing the decision maker to view, over time, any particular program or element
thereof in the light of full cost implications and financial feasibility, and pro-
viding therein a sound basis for the development of annual budget requests to
the Congress.
The Five -Year Force Structure and Financial Program, which repre-
sents the entire Defense effort, is organized into eight major military pro-
grams. These are:
I Strategic Retaliatory Forces
II Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces
(including Civil Defense)
III General Purpose Forces
IV Airlift and Sealift
V Reserve and Guard Forces





Each major program is composed of a combination of time-phased
program elements assembled toward accomplishment of a definite plan or
objective as outlined by the particular program. These program elements,
of which there are over 1, 100 presently identified and new elements being
added, are the basic building blocks of the FYFS&FP. Program elements
form the interface between defense programs and budgets in that they may be
Aggregated into meaningful measures of functional performance of missions,
on the one hand, and into traditional appropriation categories of budgets, on
the other. Program element dollars constitute the common denominator
which permits the transfiguration of missions into budgets and budgets into
missions at this point of interface.
The FYFS&FP is maintained through a series of program reviews,
program changes, and cost reporting procedures. Defense components are
responsible for maintaining a continuous surveillance and review of their
programs and for submitting change proposals promptly whenever there is
need for revisions which meet or exceed threshold limitations. In addition,
the programming system provides for annual comprehensive reviews which
are designed to provide background for early change decisions to the
FYFS&FP, which will form the basis for the next budget submission. Other
reviews include requirements studies directed by the Secretary of Defense,
proposed force changes resulting from JCS review of the Joint Strategic
Objectives Plan, and functional area reviews of interrelated program ele-
ments or aggregations, such as intelligence or communications.
.'
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In order to reflect the latest and best information on prices and costs,
cost reporting procedures require that repricing changes which meet or exceed
program element or item thresholds be submitted for review and approval
through program change orooosals as soon as identified.
The FYFS&FP is advanced annually by one year in accordance with a
schedule which allows the new year forces, manpower, costs, and support
items to be considered in the context of the comprehensive program reviews.
Budgeting
Following annual review and updating of the Five -Year Force Structure
and Financial Program, the Secretary's budgeting task revolves around
detaching the next succeeding fiscal slice from the approved program, recon-
structing it into conventional budget categories, and submitting it to higher
levels for review and approval.
Annually, in October, the budget becomes the subject of joint review
at the Bureau of the Budget by Department of Defense and Budget Bureau
officials. Here a budget ceiling is established on defense spending in order
to keep it in line with the President's estimate of the amount of defense spend-
ing the economy can bear. Since the magnitude of dollar resources that can
be allocated to defense spending in any one year is usually less than the total
of programs approved in the FYFS&FP, certaifc programs may have to be
reduced or deleted when the budget is modified. The Secretary of Defense
makes decisions regarding those programs he feels will have to be cut, and
he transmits this information to the services. This is accomplished through
{.got*
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the Subject Issue (S/I) process, more popularly known as "Operation Snow-
flake. " The Secretary may issue several hundred such subject /issue papers
during the process of budget formulation. To the extent that the services
feel that restoration of such cuts is essential to effective performance of the
mission assigned, they are permitted to request reconsideration by means of
reclama.
The defense budget, as approved by the President through the Bureau
of the Budget, becomes a part of the President's government -wide financial
plan for the following fiscal year. This approved defense plan serves as the
basis for a major updating of the FYFS&FP in December or January, in
order to bring the program into complete agreement with the budget submitted
by the President to the Congress. This major updating serves as a base for
subsequent monthly updating to reflect all decisions and changes made during
the month, including any repianning or reprogramming actions resulting
from Congressional review of the budget.
Passage by Congress of all authorization and appropriation bills is
usually complete by late summer. The individual services request appor-
tionment of their particular approved funds by the Bureau of the Budget, as
each supporting appropriations bill is passed. Such funds as are apportioned
are subject to release to the requesting services by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller), as approved for program execution, thus com-




The Five -Year Force Structure and Financial Program is designed to
give the Secretary of Defense control over the programs of ail components of
the Department of Defense. A Program Change Control System provides the
machinery by which this control device is updated and, in addition, assures
that cost and performance variances, as well as shifting force and resource
requirements, are brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense for
decision making. The Secretary's function in updating the FYFS&FP is facili-
tated by Program Change Proposal (PCP) procedures which offer a methodical
and systematic approach to decision making in terms of missions, capabili-
ties, and costs.
Basic to the Program Change Control System is the establishment of
formal decision-making thresholds. Implementing DQD components are
required to submit for prior Secretary of Defense approval, any decisions
which singly or in the aggregate exceed these thresholds. Other program
change proposal requirements result from Secretary of Defense decisions
handed down, which must be answered by formal PCP submission.
Current thresholds are exhibited in the Figure on the succeeding page.
Threshold -related PCP's may originate in response to any of the following
requirements:
1. The DOD components are responsible for maintaining a contin-
uous surveillance and review of their programs, and for submitting
change proposals promptly whenever there is a need for revisions which
meet or exceed threshold limitations. The responsibility for submitting














































o o o B
=! 3 3 3
•r* .t-< .r* *r*
6 E E E
ui in in o
ivj fvj in



































d d d c c d
O C
•|4 »»4 .w .,* .<x • rt






.-< .p< .-- •*4
£ E E £ E £
o m o o ir> o
pal — v* <VJ




























































































































components are encouraged to submit program changes for any area of
interest or concern to them.
2. To reflect the latest and best information in the FYFS&FP on
prices and costs, repricing changes which meet or exceed program ele-
ment or item thresholds will be submitted for review and approval
through program change proposals as soon as identified.
3. Above -threshold changes to the FYFS&FP will be processed
through program change proposal procedures. Such PCP's will reflect
relevant changes applicable to prior, current, budget, and all program
years.
4. Changes in the program from the latest approved FYFS&FP
which are below prescribed thresholds and are not subject to approval
requirements of existing directives or instructions may be approved on
the authority of the htjads of the DOC components, provided that the
aggregate of such departmental or DOD component changes are less than
the applicable threshold. When the aggregate of these changes, together
with the additional changes proposed, equals or exceeds a threshold , a
program change proposal will be submitted.
5. While Total Obligational Authority (TOA) changes to the
FYFS&FP which affect only those years prior to the first program year
are submitted under reprogramming procedures, those program change
proposals which meet or exceed applicable TOA thresholds in program
years and also affect prior years require submission of a PCP and a re-
programming action following the Secretary's decision on the PCP.
(During the first six months of the current fiscal year, the first program
year is the budget year. During the last six months of the current fiscal
year, the first program year is the budget year plus one).
Non-threshold related Program Change Proposal submissions may
be required as a result of Annual Comprehensive Program Reviews. These
reviews provide the background for early decisions on changes to the FYFS&FF
which will form the basis for the next budget submission. The reviews will
include but will not be limited to:
1. Requirements studies directed by the Secretary of Defense.




3. Functional area reviews of interrelated program elements or
aggregations, such as intelligence, communications, etc.
Results of studies and functional area reviews are submitted to the
Secretary of Defense for evaluation on an as occurring" basis. Comprehen-
sive proposals for force changes are submitted annually in the case of Joint
Chiefs of Staff reviews, for evaluation by the Secretary of Defense. Following
such evaluation and subsequent issuance of guidance on proposed force changes
program change proposals must be submitted by the implementing DOD com-
ponent for approval of the specific TOA and manpower required to support the
force changes.
Servicing the PCP
Department of Defense instructions provide that Program Change
Proposals will be self-contained and include all back-up information and data
and particularly factors utilised in any resource computations which are appro-
priate to the proposal under consideration, in order to facilitate staff review
and evaluation. PCP's must be signed and transmitted by the head of the sub-
mitting DOD component to the Secretary of Defense, whose office routes ail
copies to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for processing.
If the PCP is submitted by other than the implementing DOD component and
requires additional data for completion, the ASD (Comptroller) may forward




The ASD (Comptroller) reviews each PCP for clarity and sufficiency
of data, then designates an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) compo-
nent having predominant interest in the subject of the PCP as the Primary
Action Office (PMO). Other DOD components having relevant responsibilities
or interests are designated as Participating review offices. The ASD
(Comptroller) in collaboration with the primary action office establishes sus-
pense dates for review action by all review comoonents. Copies of the PCP
are forwarded to each designated review office as well as the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
All participating review components submit their evaluations and
recommendations (Format A) to the primary action office except that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit their recommendations directly to the Secre-
tary of Defense with a copy to the PMO. Emphasis is placed on a team effort
coordinated by the primary action office. The PMO prepares a consolidated
evaluati n and recommendation (Format A) for submission to the Secretary
of Defense and a proposed decision (Format B) for signature by the Secretary.
Upon signature by the Secretary of Defense, the Format B is for-
warded to ASD (Comptroller) for recording and transmittal to the submitting
and implementing DOD comoonent(s). Copies of the decision are transmitted
to the previously designated review components, including the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The head of the implementing DOD component acknowledges receipt of
the Secretary's decision bv signing a copy of the approved Format B and for-
warding it to ASD (Comptroller) within five working days of receipt. Should
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the head of the imolementing DOD component believe that the Secretary of
Defense should reconsider his decision, he may submit a reclama within ten
working days of receiot of the decision, provided that such a reclama empha-
sizes new or additional data not previously submitted.
Provision is also made for Simplified Program Change Proposals
(SPCP) which are proposals to record changes to the approved program reflect-
ing decisions already made by the Secretary of Defense or corrections or
adjustments which are not in conflict with the approved program. SPCP's
may be signed by a designated representative of the head of the submitting
DOD component and are addressed to the ASD (Comptroller), who reviews the
document, obtains any coordination necessary, takes appropriate action for
the Secretary of Defense, and transmits it to the implementing component.

CHAPTER V
IN SEARCH OF FLEXIBILITY
Factors reflected in the PCP process which inhibit flexibility of
management on the part of the individual military service and department
manager are the same ones which allow flexibility on the part of the Secretary
of Defense. It is our premise that the balance has been swung far to the side
of the Secretary as he has become increasingly enraptured with centralizing
decision making and management under his personal control.
Review
In Chapter I, we pointed to the Program Change Proposal as reflect-
ing the management techniques and requirements which contribute to system
rigidity. In addition, we examined the pre-McNamara budgeting process, the
newly implemented planning -programming -budgeting system, and ended with
a retrospective view of system performance. Our attention was directed in
Chapter II toward the level of threshold establishment and the stringency of
controls and reporting requirements as being, to some extent, indicative of
the degree to which management authority is centralized. We also discussed
the 'human problem '" associated with loss of the exercise of prerogatives and
authority by lower level managers. Our aim in Chapter III was to examine




discussed problems and limitations of the methodology as well as contrasting
the Secretary's total system aoproach to decision making with the sub-system
oriented considerations by which the lower level manager is apt to assess the
results of the same analysis.
In Chapter IV we reviewed the current planning -orogramming-
budgeting process and current Program Change Proposal procedures, includ-
ing established thresholds, as shown in the Figure on page 38.
The Stringent Bonds of Conformity
Our purpose now is to examine this process in the light of previous
discussions and criticisms, as well as other available evidence, with the ulti-
mate aim of suggesting changes to the present pxocess which will not only
serve the Secretary's needs, but which will better serve the needs of service
managers in terms of flexibility of management within their own departments,
and improved quality and responsivness of service inputs to defense decision
making.
We have seen that the Secretary's control over the defense establish-
ment has been facilitated through the Program Change Proposal device. PCP's
are required to be submitted whenever an established threshold is broken or
whenever the Secretary announces a decision affecting the approved FYFS&FP,
either directly or indirectly (such as in the case of authorization of a new pro-
gram or element thereof). Not only is the Secretary in a position to manage
the Defense Department by directing his attention toward the exceptions to
-n
45
the approved defense program, but he insures compliance with his decisions
by requiring that the Format B bearing his decision must be signed and re-
turned by the head of the implementing DOD component. Should the head of
this DOD component wish to reclama the Secretary's decision, he must,
within ten working days, gather, formulate, and submit all new, previously
unconsidered data in support of the reclama. Thus, we see that all decisions
of the Secretary are final, at least with respect to supporting data available
at the time of the decision. Unless the military manager can gather addi-
tional data to support his professional judgment on the subject matter of the
PCP within ten working days, this valuable judgment goes unheeded (perhaps
this short reclama period is a device reflecting a desire of the Secretary to
keep lower level agencies from constantly reopening issues, as was dis-
cussed in Chapter II).
Thresholds and Centralized Authority
Thresholds, as established by the Secretary of Defense, serve to
faci litate management by exception" on his part. The lower these thresholds
are established, the more "all-knowing" is the Secretary and the more he
gathers decision making to his own hierarchical position. It is readily
apparent to us that the lower these thresholds are established, the less the
service manager has to say about how he runs his service, the greater is the
demand for compliance alone in the performance of his duties, and the more
substantiating reports of compliance and other feedback information that must
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be funneled upward to support this diminished authority. In this light, it is
interesting to note that one high-ranking service manager recently confided
that his service alone had submitted over 5 million pages of documentation in
the last year in support of PCP submissions, studies, and feedback reports
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Thresholds, as reflected in published PCP procedures are low. For
example, one can note from the Figure on page 38 that any change in DOD
component TOA, manpower, forces, or new program elements penetrates
the established thresholds and therefore requires formal PCP submission and
the Secretary's approval. Other thresholds established for research and
development, investment, and operating costs are similarly low in relation
to total dollar expenditures. Since the Secretary of Defense has reserved for
himself approval authority over all threshold penetrations, we can say that
authority i£ centralized in the hands of the Secretary of Defense.
The reader will recall our contention in Chapter II that the degree of
system flexibility varies directly with the level at which subordinate's author-
ity thresholds are established and inversely with the stringency of perform-
ance standards and reporting requirements (e. g. , the requirement that full
and detailed costs accompany initial PCP submission). We have since estab-
lished that present thresholds are low and that authority is highly centralized
in the hands of the Secretary. In these resoects, we find that the system
Name and service withheld due to sensitivity of individual's position.
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described above is parallel in structure, threshold -wise, to the theoretical
OSR assessed by McKean and Anshen, in terms of problems, risks, and
2
limitations of program budgeting.
We believe that present thresholds are too low and that, as a result,
the value of the management-by- exception principle is lost to the Secretary
of Defense because nearly all program changes are exceptions to the estab-
lished thresholds. Furthermore, there is no procedure by which PCP's can
be ordered in terms of importance or sensitivity to the decision at hand,
since present thresholds do not differentiate categorically between the size
or importance of individual issues, and all require the same extensive cost
data submission.
We contend that management should be decentralized, giving military
service and department managers authority commensurate with their respon-
sibilities, and that elevated thresholds, resulting from decentralized author-
ity, should also be modified to differentiate between issues in relation to their
relative importance. That this contention is feasible is supported by McKean
3
and Anshen. These writers, while noting that program budgeting may be
"conducive to centralization of authority, " point out that there is "no inherent
4
necessity for such a relationship. Further, they assert that program









budgeting and the accompanying < ontrol devices should be designed to accom-
modate . . different situations. It should not be a procrustean bed that
forces all decisions and activities to adjust to a single procedure and a single
degree of central control.
It would seem that findings of McKinsey and Company, as expressed
in their preliminary study of the DOD management planning process, would
also tend to support our argument. Their review of nearly 500 PCP's indi-
cated no correlation between the size or importance of the decision and the
amount of detailed documentation generated. In addition, they looked with
disfavor upon the requirement that the Secretary must approve every indi-
vidual PCP that breaks current thresholds, regardless of its significance.
Their report states:
We believe important issues cannot be defined in quantitative
terms alone; therefore, an across-the-board threshold is inadequate
for identifying those issues that should receive full OSD attention. At
best, this lack of discrimination appears to waste the time of both
proposal preparers and reviewers; at worst, it prevents devoting ade-
quate time to the key decisions.
Thus, McKinsey and Company and McKean and Anshen have opened
the door for our arguments. Defense authority should be decentralized and
thresholds should be raised. In addition, individual thresholds should be
established to fit the particular force, manpower, program element, or
5
Ibid.
McKinsey and Company, Inc. (Management Consultants), Prelim-
inary Study of the Defense Department Management Planning Process,
Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) dated
January 5, 1966, p. 3.
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item in relation to its importance and the magnitude of its effect on the major
program of which it is a r>art.
Decision and the Value Judgment
The Secretary's decisions, as handed down to the DOD components,
reflect his value judgments as they come to bear on the particular decision.
These value judgments are not always in consonance with what the service
manager might consider prudent management judgments. As Baldwin points
out, for instance, the F-lll (TFX) contract 'went ... to General Dynamics
. . . although the services, in three separate evaluations, preferred the
7
Boeing proposal. "
The point here is that for all the professional military judgment,
experience, efforts, resource expenditures, and time that go into such serv-
ice evaluations or studies, the final decision, even when cost -effectiveness
analyses are used, is simply a reflection of the Secretary's own particular
convictions and value judgments, as modified by political and economic con-
siderations. Daniel Seligman reaches this same conclusion. He observes:
McNamara's value judgments, expressed in the relationships he
finds between costs and effectiveness, probably should be questioned
much more closely than they have been. Is he making the kind of "leaps"
from the data that we want?®
7





Practice Makes Perfect '
In addition to the Secretary's value judgments, we feel that the cost-
effectiveness analyses, too, upon which these value judgments are supposedly
based, should be looked at much more closely. We wonder if the vast streams
of data required to support PCP submissions are truly necessary and benefi-
cial, or simply a device to keep the Office of Systems Analysis alive } Hitch,
reflecting on cost-effectiveness studies, states:
Where the information generated is not visibly used in the actual
decision-making process, the capability to perform such analyses will
wither. So the programing system has been designed to ensure through
the program change procedures that the fruits of cost-effectiveness
studies in the form of proposals for program changes will receive
timely and complete review. '
McKinsey and Company report findings that we believe result
directly from this process designed to feed the cost -effectiveness appetite of
DOD:
1. The present system is burdened with unnecessary detail. For
example, PCP's must contain sufficient detail to update the FYFS&FP,
substantially more detail than is typically needed for decision making.
Nor are these data specifically geared to the decision to be made.
Moreover, because nearly 50 percent of the PCP's submitted are
rejected or substantially modified, the requirement that PCP's accom-
pany the original proposal results in much wasted work.
2. That the system does not effectively support decision making
is borne out by the fact that, while dedicated to the system, DOD per-
sonnel for practical purposes have bypassed it in many instances. For
example, PCP's are in fact rarely used as the document to resolve
major issues. These decisions are now largely made in conjunction
with draft Presidential Memorandums, Secretary of Defense memoran-
dums, etc.
9




3. Both program change proposers ana reviewers tend to hold up
PCP's until the calendar deadline (or beyond), even though they could
have been submitted earlier. This batching by the services reflects
a need to aggregate related issues, as veil as the desire to use the
latest possible information in PCP submissions . . . the tendency to
hold up PCP's contributes to the fact that roughly 30 percent of these
proposals are 'folded in" to the budget process, thereby defeating a key
objective of the system, namely, to make defense decisions in longer
range, program terms. *"-
It is our contention that the complexity built into the PCP system to
support cost-effectiveness analyses is the same complexity that burdens the
system with unnecessary detail and that efforts to avoid this unnecessary
detail result in bypassing the system as well as batching ' the PCP's for
deadline submission. This complexity is traceable again to centralized
authority under top defense management. Hitch, for instance, in initially
viewing the new programming system, reported, ' . . . we have provided
the necessary flexibility in the form of a program change control system. "
That this assumption of system flexibility gave way, rather, to system com-
plexity is borne out by Novick's observation:
It was originally thought that only summary-type data would be
required in the initial submission of a change proposal. However,
Mr. McNamara's requirement has been for rather full justification of
the proposal and as complete detail (forces, costs, manpower, pro-
curement schedules, financing, etc.) as is appropriate to the evalua-
tion. 12
McKinsey and Company, Inc.
, op. cit. , p. 3-4.
Hitch, Decision Making for Defense
, p. 39.
Novick, op. cit. , p. 67.
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It would seem, from the numerous shortcomings discussed, that
>erhans the defense management orocess itself would benefit from a thorough





The reader will recall our research question, "Can the Program
Change Proposal System be modified in such a way as to improve program-
ming flexibility and responsiveness to change 1 " Our prefatory remarks
recognized present centralization of authority in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense as a key ' causal factor promoting system rigidity. Threshold
levels and detailed costing requirements were recognized as being the
"handles ' by which we would grasp the problem.
Our findings have supported the contention that thresholds, as cur-
rently established, lend themselves to system rigidity in that service level
managers lack the bargaining power and influence necessary to promote
innovative efforts and keep them "looking for business. " Our prefatory
thoughts concerning detailed costing requirements have, however, proved
somewhat "off target and our findings have led instead to cost -effectiveness
analyses as supported by the detailed costing requirements, as lending
rigidity to the system. The results of our study indicate that the Program
Change Propocal can be modified in such a way as to improve system flexi-





Present thresholds, as previously discussed, are not only low but
possess the undesirable features of applying the same low categorical ceilings
and requiring the same vast amount of burdensome documentation in support
of all PCP's regardless of their importance to the decision at hand. This,
coupled with the Defense Secretary's requirement that he must approve all
program changes, gives us some indication of the amount of superfluous
effort generated by QSD.
As we discussed in Chapter II, problems such as this do not lend
themselves to isolated examination, nor to optimal solutions. Rather,
recommendation of a more favorable range of activity or degree of compli-
ance is the logical solution. Our recommendations concerning thresholds
are:
1. Thresholds should be raised . They should be raised enough to
provide service level managers with the decision -making authority at their
own level, and the bargaining power at QSD level that would provide the incen-
tive for this manager to seek continually better alternatives and to give him
the opportunity to "sell' his product to OSD. While we cannot quantify the
degree to which thresholds should be raised, if it is achieved, it will be evi-
denced by service salesmen standing at the Secretary's door.
2* Percentage thresholds should be established. The present
"across-the-board" thresholds are, as previously discussed, unsatisfactory.
Our solution would be to apply "percentage* thresholds to particular categories
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or issues, with particularly sensitive issues being identified and marked by a
smaller percentage. This would allow issues to be categorized (a) in a rela-
tionship to the relative cost of the issue as compared with others in its cate-
gory (e. g. , by size) and (b) with respect to established and identified relative
sensitivity in relation to other issues. This, we believe, would shrink the
Secretary's daily menu of undifferentiated PCP's, thus allowing his efforts
to be concentrated on the really important issues. In addition, it would give
the service manager much needed flexibility in that he would be free of the
shortcomings of the across-the-board thresholds and would be able to devote
his time and efforts to particular issues insome relationship to their impor-
tance or sensitivity.
3« Full data submission should accompany only those PCP's for
which such data are known to influence the final decision. Present unneces-
sary detail which we have determined burdens the PCP system can be alle-
viated somewhat through early identification of sensitive issues in conjunction
with the establishment of the percentage thresholds recommended in para-
graph 2 above. Our recommendation is that full documentation and justifica-
tion should be reserved for only those relatively few change proposals involv-
ing high sensitivity issues, in which it has been ascertained that such data




While our early discussions of systems analysis (of which cost-
effectiveness analyses are a part) brought out certain limitations of the
methodology, we can see that the process does have much merit and can, in
some circumstances, be of particular usefulness to the decision maker. In
our later discussions, however, we came to wonder whether a great deal of
the required data submission which burdens the PCP system is not merely
for analytical practice. In this light, our closing remark to the last chapter
was not made in jest. Our recommendations are:
1. A thorough cost -benefit analysis of the present PCP process is
in order . Such an analysis should be undertaken as a step toward highlighting
the costs to DOD components of supporting the present requirement for full
and detailed data submission to accompany each PCP. Such costs could be
summarized, in dollar terms, by such categories as manhours, electronic
and telephonic transmissions, reams of paper, copying machines, computer
systems, back-up files, supporting civilian analysts, and other support
requirements. Many necessary processes have suddenly seemed "not so
necessary '"' when their dollar costs are thus exposed.
2. Systems analysis should be developed as a departmental and
service 'in-house" capability . This in-house ' capability would insure that
the objectives of such analyses, along with the alternatives, assumptions,
and criteria would be developed in the light of experienced military judgment.
The usefulness of this capability at military service and department level
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would bear a relationship to the extent to which thresholds are raised in
accordance with our previous recommendation, thus relaxing decision -making
authority at service level. With this recommendation comes the proposal
that service decisions could be made the subject of after-the-fact review by
OSD in those cases where it is felt that such analyses would substantially aid
in making the decision. Service managers would benefit from increased
flexibility in their exercise of authority and decision making, while the Secre-
tary and his systems analysts could concentrate almost entirely on key de-
fense decisions and problems that cross traditional service boundaries.
3. The PCP system should be retained, not abandoned, and should
be modified toward greater flexibility and responsiveness. While much cur-
rent thought centers on doing away with the PCP, it is our belief that Ma
change proposal by any other name is still a change proposal, " and that such
a process is necessary to the programming system. We would confine the
PCP to threshold related submissions. We would delete the requirement that
full costing and justification accompany PCP submission, and we would con-
centrate on submission of summary data to support variance analysis only.
Threshold sensitivity, in this respect, should be established so that repro-
gramming requirements as set forth by the Congress are the determining
criteria. Congress would most likely revise these reprogramming criteria
upward as the Secretary of Defense demonstrated a thoroughgoing and work-
able system in support of variance analysis, as their purpose is to assure
that funds duly appropriated are wisely spent. PCP's oriented toward
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variance analysis would permit the Secretary of Defense to assess manage-
ment performance at lower levels as well as to isolate and identify causal
factors. Cost -effectiveness analysis, assuming the in-house systems
analysis capability recommended in paragraph Z above, could enter the pro-
gramming process in connection with service inputs to the JSOP. The Secre-
tary, in conjunction with his systems analysis staff, would combine an after-
the-fact review of cost-effectiveness inputs to the JSOP with the scheduled
annual JSOP review. The only documentation required, then, in order to
effect a change, would be transmission of the decision to the DOD components
for the purpose of updating the approved FYFS&FP.
Conclusions
In conclusion, our only reservations with respect to the foregoing
recommendations are concerned with the motives of the Secretary of Defense
himself. We wonder if, perhaps, the burdens of centralized authority and
decision making, along with a detailed end costly change proposal process,
are not deliberarely calculated prices that the Secretary would charge in
order to keep decisions from constantly being reopened, to prevent lines of
military service and department salesmen from forming at his door, and,
above all, to assert his full authority over those who have thought to close
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